Three writers explore the past and present of India’s relations with the world, and ties in the neighbourhood, to trace the path ahead. In doing so, they ask what should India’s strategy be and explain why veering away from its traditionally peaceable and liberal ethos is not the way forward
For as long as states have had conflicts, thinkers have tried to set out the terms of a “grand strategy” of a country, one that draws together its national power and resources with its diplomatic, military and economic ambitions. For India’s Chanakya (Arthashastra), or for military generals like Thucydides (History of the Peloponnesian War), Sun Tzu (The Art of War) and Carl von Clausewitz (On War), the focus was on how to wage war. Amidst present-day realities of relative peace, their writings are now quoted in books on battles for diplomatic influence instead.
Friends and allies
At least three recent books have aimed to look at a ‘grand strategy’ for Indian foreign policy in the 21st century, harking in some measure to ancient strategic wisdom. In Friends: India’s Closest Strategic Partners, Professor at Jindal University Sreeram Chaulia writes about the seven countries he thinks are India’s most important allies, including Japan, Australia, the U.S., Russia, France, Israel and the UAE. While none of the partnerships constitutes an “alliance”, he speaks instead of the need for friendships for India’s strategy to “assume its destiny as a leading power” of the world. Chaulia’s argument for a world of friendships is three-fold. One, that India cannot depend on a multilateral framework to advance on this path and needs specific bilateral relationships to power it forward. The second, India’s friends are by and large those who believe in Indian strategic autonomy. The third, that these friends are invested in India using its strategic independence as a countervailing or deterrent challenge to Chinese hegemony. There are obvious exceptions to these rules. The U.S. may not be a fan of Indian strategic autonomy — U.S. Ambassador to India Eric Garcetti recently indicated in a speech that in conflict, partners must choose sides. Russia aims to bring India and China closer (as President Putin sought at the recent BRICS summit with a Narendra Modi-Xi Jinping meet after years). It is also clear that none of India’s neighbouring countries qualify in Chaulia’s calculus as countries that can help India’s rise, a thesis by exclusion that many Indian thinkers would disagree with. The book is remarkable, however, for its clarity of thought in an age where writers often hedge their bets, in line with India’s own amorphous and sometimes ambiguous foreign policy choices. The organisation of the chapters, with one for each of India’s friends chosen by Chaulia is also helpful, especially for students of each of these important relationships.
Positioning India’s strengths
Also out this season is McGill University Professor T.V. Paul’s excellent The Unfinished Quest: India’s Search for Major Power Status from Nehru to Modi. If Chaulia’s ‘Friends’, works within the silos of each relationship, Paul’s ‘Quest’ flows chronologically from India’s independence, in a treatise on Indian power and its practical past. Long before External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar said that India’s ambitions have shifted from being a “balancing power” to a “leading power”, Paul points out the Nehru had visualised India as “one of the “four great powers of the post-war international system”, along with the U.S., the Soviet Union and China. Paul also, correctly, positions India’s civilisational attributes, including the cultural and religious aspects, now at the forefront of the Modi government’s diplomatic forays, as part of its “soft power”, adding that the status of “Vishwaguru” or even “Vishwamitra” would elude India if it veers from its traditionally peaceable and liberal ethos that contribute to it. Paul’s evaluation of India’s economic and military heft is well researched and worth reading, particularly as he presents them in absolute and comparative terms to other global powers. Unlike Chaulia, Paul does carry a chapter on “The Neighbours”, but like Chaulia, he concludes that India’s global status will increase even without gaining leverage in South Asia.
The turning point
Finally, there’s Dhruva Jaishankar’s Viswa Shastra: India and The World, a scholarly recounting of Indian foreign policy over the ages, that begins with ancient strategic treatises, goes through pre-independence foreign policy thought, followed by the first few decades of the Indian Republic. Jaishankar marks 1991 as a significant turning point of “fundamental change” in Indian foreign policy — broadly as a reaction to global events like the Gulf war, Israel-Palestine peace process, the collapse of the Soviet Union and withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the resultant period of U.S.-led unipolarity in the world. Jaishankar, the third in his family line of strategic thinkers, weaves the intricacies of India’s foreign policy past with considerable ease, leading up to the present period in 2024. Part 1, “History”, is scrupulously well presented, followed by Part 2 titled “Strategy”, where it is possible for different schools of foreign policy thinking to differ. Jaishankar lists 14 “priorities” for Indian strategy, ranging from the need to improve military and industrial capabilities, securing partnerships in the Indian Ocean, ASEAN region and Middle East/West Asia, to strengthening multilateral institutions. Jaishankar sets his case on India’s challenges by simply saying that “China’s rise is likely the primary factor influencing India’s grand strategy”, and the other priorities he lists — on managing China, working with the Quad and others in the Indo-Pacific etc — speak to this understanding. Unlike Chaulia and Paul, Jaishankar puts much more focus on India’s ties with its neighbours, including Afghanistan (Prioritise Neighbours, Talk to Afghanistan), making an exception for Pakistan (Compel Pakistan) for which he recommends a different treatment.
All three books mark a refreshing departure from strategic works of the past decade that focused on the Modi “moment” in Indian foreign policy post-2014. Those works had portrayed policies of the Modi/UPA government as a break from the past, often mistaking innovations such as public rallies for the diaspora, personalised summit-level diplomacy (the Sabarmati swing with Xi or the car ride in the Beast with Obama), social media usage and the promotion of yoga, meditation, Hindi and Sanskrit, the scriptures etc for transformational foreign policy. On this, all ancient strategic thinkers such as Chanakya, Clausewitz et al were clear — a key component of effective policy formation is the ability to discern grand strategy from tactics.
In search of a ‘grand strategy’ for India’s foreign policy in the 21st century
Three writers explore the past and present of India’s relations with the world, and ties in the neighbourhood, to trace the path ahead. In doing so, they ask what should India’s strategy be and explain why veering away from its traditionally peaceable and liberal ethos is not the way forward
For as long as states have had conflicts, thinkers have tried to set out the terms of a “grand strategy” of a country, one that draws together its national power and resources with its diplomatic, military and economic ambitions. For India’s Chanakya (Arthashastra), or for military generals like Thucydides (History of the Peloponnesian War), Sun Tzu (The Art of War) and Carl von Clausewitz (On War), the focus was on how to wage war. Amidst present-day realities of relative peace, their writings are now quoted in books on battles for diplomatic influence instead.
Friends and allies
At least three recent books have aimed to look at a ‘grand strategy’ for Indian foreign policy in the 21st century, harking in some measure to ancient strategic wisdom. In Friends: India’s Closest Strategic Partners, Professor at Jindal University Sreeram Chaulia writes about the seven countries he thinks are India’s most important allies, including Japan, Australia, the U.S., Russia, France, Israel and the UAE. While none of the partnerships constitutes an “alliance”, he speaks instead of the need for friendships for India’s strategy to “assume its destiny as a leading power” of the world. Chaulia’s argument for a world of friendships is three-fold. One, that India cannot depend on a multilateral framework to advance on this path and needs specific bilateral relationships to power it forward. The second, India’s friends are by and large those who believe in Indian strategic autonomy. The third, that these friends are invested in India using its strategic independence as a countervailing or deterrent challenge to Chinese hegemony. There are obvious exceptions to these rules. The U.S. may not be a fan of Indian strategic autonomy — U.S. Ambassador to India Eric Garcetti recently indicated in a speech that in conflict, partners must choose sides. Russia aims to bring India and China closer (as President Putin sought at the recent BRICS summit with a Narendra Modi-Xi Jinping meet after years). It is also clear that none of India’s neighbouring countries qualify in Chaulia’s calculus as countries that can help India’s rise, a thesis by exclusion that many Indian thinkers would disagree with. The book is remarkable, however, for its clarity of thought in an age where writers often hedge their bets, in line with India’s own amorphous and sometimes ambiguous foreign policy choices. The organisation of the chapters, with one for each of India’s friends chosen by Chaulia is also helpful, especially for students of each of these important relationships.
Positioning India’s strengths
Also out this season is McGill University Professor T.V. Paul’s excellent The Unfinished Quest: India’s Search for Major Power Status from Nehru to Modi. If Chaulia’s ‘Friends’, works within the silos of each relationship, Paul’s ‘Quest’ flows chronologically from India’s independence, in a treatise on Indian power and its practical past. Long before External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar said that India’s ambitions have shifted from being a “balancing power” to a “leading power”, Paul points out the Nehru had visualised India as “one of the “four great powers of the post-war international system”, along with the U.S., the Soviet Union and China. Paul also, correctly, positions India’s civilisational attributes, including the cultural and religious aspects, now at the forefront of the Modi government’s diplomatic forays, as part of its “soft power”, adding that the status of “Vishwaguru” or even “Vishwamitra” would elude India if it veers from its traditionally peaceable and liberal ethos that contribute to it. Paul’s evaluation of India’s economic and military heft is well researched and worth reading, particularly as he presents them in absolute and comparative terms to other global powers. Unlike Chaulia, Paul does carry a chapter on “The Neighbours”, but like Chaulia, he concludes that India’s global status will increase even without gaining leverage in South Asia.
The turning point
Finally, there’s Dhruva Jaishankar’s Viswa Shastra: India and The World, a scholarly recounting of Indian foreign policy over the ages, that begins with ancient strategic treatises, goes through pre-independence foreign policy thought, followed by the first few decades of the Indian Republic. Jaishankar marks 1991 as a significant turning point of “fundamental change” in Indian foreign policy — broadly as a reaction to global events like the Gulf war, Israel-Palestine peace process, the collapse of the Soviet Union and withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the resultant period of U.S.-led unipolarity in the world. Jaishankar, the third in his family line of strategic thinkers, weaves the intricacies of India’s foreign policy past with considerable ease, leading up to the present period in 2024. Part 1, “History”, is scrupulously well presented, followed by Part 2 titled “Strategy”, where it is possible for different schools of foreign policy thinking to differ. Jaishankar lists 14 “priorities” for Indian strategy, ranging from the need to improve military and industrial capabilities, securing partnerships in the Indian Ocean, ASEAN region and Middle East/West Asia, to strengthening multilateral institutions. Jaishankar sets his case on India’s challenges by simply saying that “China’s rise is likely the primary factor influencing India’s grand strategy”, and the other priorities he lists — on managing China, working with the Quad and others in the Indo-Pacific etc — speak to this understanding. Unlike Chaulia and Paul, Jaishankar puts much more focus on India’s ties with its neighbours, including Afghanistan (Prioritise Neighbours, Talk to Afghanistan), making an exception for Pakistan (Compel Pakistan) for which he recommends a different treatment.
All three books mark a refreshing departure from strategic works of the past decade that focused on the Modi “moment” in Indian foreign policy post-2014. Those works had portrayed policies of the Modi/UPA government as a break from the past, often mistaking innovations such as public rallies for the diaspora, personalised summit-level diplomacy (the Sabarmati swing with Xi or the car ride in the Beast with Obama), social media usage and the promotion of yoga, meditation, Hindi and Sanskrit, the scriptures etc for transformational foreign policy. On this, all ancient strategic thinkers such as Chanakya, Clausewitz et al were clear — a key component of effective policy formation is the ability to discern grand strategy from tactics.
In search of a ‘grand strategy’ for India’s foreign policy in the 21st century
Three writers explore the past and present of India’s relations with the world, and ties in the neighbourhood, to trace the path ahead. In doing so, they ask what should India’s strategy be and explain why veering away from its traditionally peaceable and liberal ethos is not the way forward
For as long as states have had conflicts, thinkers have tried to set out the terms of a “grand strategy” of a country, one that draws together its national power and resources with its diplomatic, military and economic ambitions. For India’s Chanakya (Arthashastra), or for military generals like Thucydides (History of the Peloponnesian War), Sun Tzu (The Art of War) and Carl von Clausewitz (On War), the focus was on how to wage war. Amidst present-day realities of relative peace, their writings are now quoted in books on battles for diplomatic influence instead.
Friends and allies
At least three recent books have aimed to look at a ‘grand strategy’ for Indian foreign policy in the 21st century, harking in some measure to ancient strategic wisdom. In Friends: India’s Closest Strategic Partners, Professor at Jindal University Sreeram Chaulia writes about the seven countries he thinks are India’s most important allies, including Japan, Australia, the U.S., Russia, France, Israel and the UAE. While none of the partnerships constitutes an “alliance”, he speaks instead of the need for friendships for India’s strategy to “assume its destiny as a leading power” of the world. Chaulia’s argument for a world of friendships is three-fold. One, that India cannot depend on a multilateral framework to advance on this path and needs specific bilateral relationships to power it forward. The second, India’s friends are by and large those who believe in Indian strategic autonomy. The third, that these friends are invested in India using its strategic independence as a countervailing or deterrent challenge to Chinese hegemony. There are obvious exceptions to these rules. The U.S. may not be a fan of Indian strategic autonomy — U.S. Ambassador to India Eric Garcetti recently indicated in a speech that in conflict, partners must choose sides. Russia aims to bring India and China closer (as President Putin sought at the recent BRICS summit with a Narendra Modi-Xi Jinping meet after years). It is also clear that none of India’s neighbouring countries qualify in Chaulia’s calculus as countries that can help India’s rise, a thesis by exclusion that many Indian thinkers would disagree with. The book is remarkable, however, for its clarity of thought in an age where writers often hedge their bets, in line with India’s own amorphous and sometimes ambiguous foreign policy choices. The organisation of the chapters, with one for each of India’s friends chosen by Chaulia is also helpful, especially for students of each of these important relationships.
Positioning India’s strengths
Also out this season is McGill University Professor T.V. Paul’s excellent The Unfinished Quest: India’s Search for Major Power Status from Nehru to Modi. If Chaulia’s ‘Friends’, works within the silos of each relationship, Paul’s ‘Quest’ flows chronologically from India’s independence, in a treatise on Indian power and its practical past. Long before External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar said that India’s ambitions have shifted from being a “balancing power” to a “leading power”, Paul points out the Nehru had visualised India as “one of the “four great powers of the post-war international system”, along with the U.S., the Soviet Union and China. Paul also, correctly, positions India’s civilisational attributes, including the cultural and religious aspects, now at the forefront of the Modi government’s diplomatic forays, as part of its “soft power”, adding that the status of “Vishwaguru” or even “Vishwamitra” would elude India if it veers from its traditionally peaceable and liberal ethos that contribute to it. Paul’s evaluation of India’s economic and military heft is well researched and worth reading, particularly as he presents them in absolute and comparative terms to other global powers. Unlike Chaulia, Paul does carry a chapter on “The Neighbours”, but like Chaulia, he concludes that India’s global status will increase even without gaining leverage in South Asia.
The turning point
Finally, there’s Dhruva Jaishankar’s Viswa Shastra: India and The World, a scholarly recounting of Indian foreign policy over the ages, that begins with ancient strategic treatises, goes through pre-independence foreign policy thought, followed by the first few decades of the Indian Republic. Jaishankar marks 1991 as a significant turning point of “fundamental change” in Indian foreign policy — broadly as a reaction to global events like the Gulf war, Israel-Palestine peace process, the collapse of the Soviet Union and withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the resultant period of U.S.-led unipolarity in the world. Jaishankar, the third in his family line of strategic thinkers, weaves the intricacies of India’s foreign policy past with considerable ease, leading up to the present period in 2024. Part 1, “History”, is scrupulously well presented, followed by Part 2 titled “Strategy”, where it is possible for different schools of foreign policy thinking to differ. Jaishankar lists 14 “priorities” for Indian strategy, ranging from the need to improve military and industrial capabilities, securing partnerships in the Indian Ocean, ASEAN region and Middle East/West Asia, to strengthening multilateral institutions. Jaishankar sets his case on India’s challenges by simply saying that “China’s rise is likely the primary factor influencing India’s grand strategy”, and the other priorities he lists — on managing China, working with the Quad and others in the Indo-Pacific etc — speak to this understanding. Unlike Chaulia and Paul, Jaishankar puts much more focus on India’s ties with its neighbours, including Afghanistan (Prioritise Neighbours, Talk to Afghanistan), making an exception for Pakistan (Compel Pakistan) for which he recommends a different treatment.
All three books mark a refreshing departure from strategic works of the past decade that focused on the Modi “moment” in Indian foreign policy post-2014. Those works had portrayed policies of the Modi/UPA government as a break from the past, often mistaking innovations such as public rallies for the diaspora, personalised summit-level diplomacy (the Sabarmati swing with Xi or the car ride in the Beast with Obama), social media usage and the promotion of yoga, meditation, Hindi and Sanskrit, the scriptures etc for transformational foreign policy. On this, all ancient strategic thinkers such as Chanakya, Clausewitz et al were clear — a key component of effective policy formation is the ability to discern grand strategy from tactics.
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